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Abstract
We design an experiment to explore the impact of earned entitlements on the frequency
and intensity of conflicts in a two-stage conflict game with side-payments. In this game,
residents (Proposers) make side-payment offers and contestants (Responders) decide whether to
accept the offers and whether to engage in a conflict. When subjects earn their roles, conflicts are
44% more likely to be avoided than when roles are assigned randomly. Earned rights impact
behavior in three important ways: (1) residents who have earned their position persistently offer
larger side-payments; (2) larger offers lead to a lower probability of conflict, but (3) residents
whose offers do not lead to conflict resolution respond spitefully and exhibit greater conflict
expenditure. Hence, with earned rights, the positive welfare effects of reduced conflict frequency
are offset by higher conflict intensity.
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1. Introduction
When you reap the harvest of your land, do not reap to the very edges of your field or gather the
gleanings of your harvest. Do not go over your vineyard a second time or pick up the grapes that
have fallen. Leave them for the poor and the alien. (Leviticus 19:9-10)

The God of the Old Testament instructed his followers to leave some of the fruits of their
harvest in their fields, un-harvested. An economist might assume merely that God understood the
Law of Diminishing Returns and taught his followers accordingly. But to ignore the exhortation
to leave something behind for the poor and alien is to miss a potentially rich historical and
economic point. Why, beyond the diminishing returns to labor, might one want to leave unpicked
fruit on a vine?
The property rights to the goods are clearly delineated in this story. No indication is given
that the people for whom the gleanings are to be left have any claim to the harvest through the
application of their labor or capital to the production process. Furthermore, that one indirect
object of the exhortation is “the alien” (that is, foreigners and persons unknown) rules out the
folk theorem and the shadow of the future as explanations. One way to reconcile these issues,
then, is to postulate altruistic intentions or social preferences. However, this explanation ignores
a few historical facts which, taken together, suggest an altogether different interpretation.
During the historical era in which this text was written, the world of the Jewish people
was in upheaval. Ravaged by war, famine, and forced migrations in the previous century, the
people had begun to resettle, but for each family that settled a piece of land, there was another
traveling in search of a place of its own.1 The poor wanderer who hungrily stumbled upon a
thriving farm would have been tempted to steal from the farm for sustenance. Violence to one’s
property likely would have been met with violence, and costly conflict ensued. In this context,
the idea of leaving unpicked fruit for “the poor and alien” begins to look more strategic and less
altruistic. The leftover goods take on the characteristics of a side-payment, offered by the farmer
to ward off predation.2
In societies without strong institutional structures, the prospect of resource conflict is
similarly ubiquitous. To reduce the risk of conflict, groups often uphold informal norms of
1

Whether one accepts the timeline laid out in the text of the Old Testament itself (Genesis 12:4-9, 26:12-22; Exodus
14:5-9; Joshua 13:1-32) or one follows the standard view of Biblical historians who argue that Leviticus was first
put to paper in the wake of the Babylonian Captivity c. 500 BCE (Warington 1873, Harris 1985), this narrative can
be demonstrated to reflect the experience of the Jewish people.
2
Jones (1994) offers a similar argument for the emergence of human food sharing in general.
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reciprocal gift-giving, tolerated theft, and sharing (see e.g., Gurven 2004; Henrich et al. 2005;
Schechter 2007). However, any (implicit or explicit) promises to avoid conflict made in the
context of an informal norm are unenforceable. Thus, when one party offers resources to another
in order to deter predation, there is always the risk that the payment is accepted and then conflict
occurs anyway.
For this reason, most models of conflict resolution rely on the ability of parties to commit
to a plan of action. For example, if contracts are enforceable, then binding, strategy-contingent
transfer payments are sufficient to obviate costly conflicts in both theory and practice (Anbarci et
al. 2002; Muthoo 2004; Garfinkel and Skaperdas 2007; Esteban and Sakovics 2008; Kimbrough
and Sheremeta 2012).3 Nevertheless, in many conflicts, parties often incur large costs despite the
possibility of Pareto improving resolutions. Experimental evidence suggests that individuals are
prone to reject Pareto-improving settlements when the proposed outcome is perceived as
unfavorable (or unfair)4 and some individuals may simply enjoy fighting (or winning).5 On the
other hand, there is some evidence that even in the absence of enforceable contracts, individuals
can achieve Pareto improvements by employing conventions,6 reputation-based mechanisms, and
reciprocity, particularly in the context of the informal norms mentioned above.7 However, it is
unclear under what circumstances non-binding mechanisms can be employed to avert conflict.
In a recent study, Kimbrough and Sheremeta (2012) report a two-player game of conflict
resolution via side-payments in which the Proposer may offer a transfer payment to the
Responder in order to prevent the pair from entering into a lottery contest in which they expend
costly effort in order to claim a valuable resource. However, when accepting the side-payment
does not bind the Responder’s actions (i.e., there are no enforceable contracts), the Proposer
should never offer a side-payment because a rational Responder will always accept the transfer
and then choose to enter the contest anyway. In experimental tests of this model, subjects’
3

For a comprehensive review of the theoretical literature see Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2012) and for the
experimental literature see Dechenaux et al. (2012).
4
See Hoffman and Spitzer (1985), Guth and Tietz (1990) and Henrich et al. (2001) for experimental evidence.
5
Sheremeta (2010a, 2010b) find that subjects expend resources seeking a prize worth nothing.
6
Maynard Smith and Parker (1976) and Maynard Smith (1982) first demonstrated that employing such conventions
is an evolutionarily stable strategy in Hawk-Dove games. Similar conventions can emerge to solve numerous other
coordination problems (Young 1993; Sugden 2005). However, Grafen (1987) shows that when the chosen
convention is persistently disadvantageous to one agent, “desperado” behavior may be optimal.
7
Hafer (2006) shows that in a repeated conflict over a resource with incomplete information, possession is a signal
of success in previous conflicts and can establish expectations among potential contestants that support equilibria in
which no conflict occurs. Muthoo (2004) shows how transfers can reduce conflict in repeated games of production
and appropriation.
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behavior deviates substantially from the theoretical predictions in that: (1) Proposers make offers
significantly larger than predicted, and (2) some Responders choose not to enter the conflict,
despite the strong incentive to accept the side-payment and still enter the conflict. Noting the
affinity of their design to the Ultimatum Game, the authors hypothesize that the observed facts
may be explained by the perceived presence or absence of initial entitlements, which can impact
subjects’ willingness to bargain.
It is well documented in experimental literature that property rights (entitlements)
significantly affect behavior in ultimatum, dictator, and team production bargaining games
(Hoffman et al. 1994, 1998; Cherry et al. 2002; Oxoby and Spraggon 2008; Gachter and Riedl
2005), and there is also anthropological evidence that people treat windfall gains differently than
hard-earned gains; see e.g., Henrich et al (2005) and associated commentary. In general,
inducing a property right leads to more self-regarding behavior on the behalf of the right-holder
and more acceptance of such behavior by others without rights. To see how a perceived property
right could impact bargaining in a two-stage conflict game, suppose that a contested resource is
first discovered by one individual, call him the resident (i.e., the Proposer), and only later
contested by another, the contestant (i.e., the Responder). If the contestant believes that the
resident has a property right to the resource, then she may be more likely to accept a contractual
resolution, and knowing this, the resident may be more willing to offer a side-payment.8 This is
the effect that has been observed in previous work on entitlements in bargaining games, but our
design introduces a second dimension on which property rights may have an impact.
Specifically, previous experiments have employed exogenous disagreement payoffs, but in the
conflict game, rent dissipation in conflict is endogenous, and thus the impact of earned
entitlements may also be observed in conflict expenditures. For example, if first possession
creates an endowment effect in the resident, say, by reference to some social convention (finders
keepers), then all else equal, the resident may be willing to fight harder than the contestant for
the resource.9

8

Empirical studies of animal territoriality frequently identify a ‘residency effect’; that is, first possessors
disproportionately win resource contests (Haley 1994; Alcock and Bailey 1997; Kemp and Wiklund 2004), and a
recent experiment by DeScioli and Wilson (2011) documents the residency effect in human subjects.
9
Gintis (2007) exploits the logic of Parker’s (1974) “fighting assessment” to show how such a tendency could
describe the origin of property rights in wars of attrition: if the contestant knows that the resident will be willing to
expend more effort on defense than she will on offense, then she should respond by choosing not to fight.
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We design an experiment to explore the impact of earned entitlements on the frequency
and intensity of conflicts. In one treatment, we model a situation in which one party has come to
possess a valuable resource by chance, and in our other treatment, we model a situation closer to
that described in the biblical passage above in which one party has earned the resource. In both
cases another party can attempt to take the resource, but the parties have the opportunity to
bargain beforehand. Specifically, the experiment consists of two stages. In the bargaining stage,
the Proposer offers a side-payment to the Responder in an attempt to keep the resource and to
avoid participation in a lottery contest in the conflict stage. After receiving the offer from the
Proposer, the Responder decides whether to accept the side-payment and also whether to enter
the conflict. Hence, the Responder may accept a side-payment and nevertheless enter the
conflict. If the Responder accepts the offer, the Responder’s payoff increases by the amount of
the side-payment offer and the Proposer’s payoff decreases by the same amount. However, if the
Responder rejects the offer (or accepts the offer and still enters the conflict), both players
advance to the conflict stage, in which, according to our instructions, the Responder “may
attempt to take” the resource from the Proposer in a lottery contest. Since the side-payment
contract is not enforceable, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is for the Proposer to make a
zero side-payment offer and for the Responder to accept any offer and enter the conflict anyway.
We examine two treatments. In the Random treatment, the computer randomly assigns
the role of Proposer to each subject. In the Earned treatment, the role of Proposer is assigned to
subjects who better performed on a ten-question, general knowledge quiz (that is, subjects are
ranked according to how many questions they answer correctly, with ties broken by how quickly
they completed the quiz). We find that with random allocation of roles (Proposer and
Responder), conflicts are avoided 16% of the time, and when subjects earn their roles, conflicts
are avoided 23% of the time (a 44% increase relative to the no-entitlement baseline). This effect
is driven by the fact that Earned Proposers persistently make higher offers than Proposers in the
Random treatment. However, earned rights have no beneficial impact on average surplus; higher
levels of conflict intensity offset the positive welfare effects of reduced conflict frequency.

4

2. Experimental Environment, Design, Predictions and Procedures
2.1. Experimental Environment and Model Predictions
Our experiment examines a two-player conflict game in which both players expend
resources competing for a resource that each value at v = 60. The game is divided into two
sequential stages: the bargaining stage and the conflict stage. In the bargaining stage, the
Proposer offers a side-payment s between 0 and 60 to the Responder in an attempt to avoid
participation in a rent-seeking lottery contest in the conflict stage. After receiving the sidepayment offer s from the Proposer, the Responder decides whether to accept the offer and also
whether to enter the conflict. Hence, the Responder may accept a side-payment s and
nevertheless enter the conflict. If the Responder accepts the offer and decides not to enter the
conflict, the game ends with the Responder receiving a payoff of v – s and the Proposer receiving
a payoff of s, and neither player enter the conflict stage. In such a case, the surplus split between
the two players is Π = v – s + s = v = 60. However, if the Responder rejects the offer (or accepts
the offer and still enters the conflict), both players advance to the conflict stage, in which,
according to our instructions, the Responder “may attempt to take” the prize from the Proposer.
In the conflict stage, the Proposer and the Responder partake in the rent-seeking lottery
contest due to Tullock (1980) between two symmetric players (i.e., player 1 and player 2). Both
players expend costly resources e1 and e2 to increase their probabilities of winning the prize. A
player i‘s probability of winning is defined by a lottery contest success function, i.e., pi(e1, e2) =
ei/(e1 + e2). The expected payoff for a risk-neutral player i is E(πi) = pi(e1, e2)v – ei. By
differentiating E(πi) with respect to ei and solving the best response functions simultaneously, we
obtain unique Nash equilibrium expenditure levels e1* = e2* = v/4 = 15. Given the equilibrium
expenditures, the expected payoffs of both players are E(π1*) = E(π2*) = v/4 = 15. Hence, the
equilibrium prediction for the Tullock contest, independent of the bargaining stage, is that both
players will expend 15 and each will receive on average a payoff of 15. Given that the game
proceeds to the conflict stage, the equilibrium surplus split between the two players is Π* =
E(π1*) + E(π2*) = v/2 = 30.
Going back to the bargaining stage, since the side-payment is non-binding, the Responder
has a dominant strategy to always accept the side-payment s and to enter the conflict stage,
where she earns an additional expected payoff of 15. Thus, knowing that the Responder cannot
be dissuaded from conflict in the bargaining stage, the Proposer should never offer a side5

payment, i.e., s* = 0, and the game should always reach the conflict stage. Hence, the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium is for the Proposer to offer a side-payment of zero and for the
Responder to accept all the offers and always enter the conflict.

2.2. Experimental Design
Building on this environment, we employ a between-subjects experimental design to
explore the impact of earned rights on the frequency and intensity of conflict. Our treatments
vary whether a subject’s assignment to the role of Proposer is Earned or Random. In the Earned
treatment, after reading the instructions, all subjects took a ten-question, general knowledge quiz.
Subjects were ranked by the number of questions they answered correctly and ties were broken
by how quickly the answers were submitted. The subjects knew that they would be assigned their
roles on the basis of their performance on the quiz. They were also told that the top performers
on the quiz had “earned the right to be Proposers” and that the bottom half were assigned to be
Responders. While the instructions in all treatments indicated that Proposers had prior claims to
the resource – recall the statement that Responders “may attempt to take” the resource from
Proposers – in the Earned treatment we allocate these prior claims by relative performance on
the quiz rather than randomly, as in the other treatments. The outline of the experimental design
and theoretical predictions are shown in Table 1.

2.3. The Hypothesized Effects of Earned Rights
Note that the Earned treatment changes neither the structure of the game nor the expected
payoffs relative to the Random treatment. However, it has been well documented in experimental
literature that when subjects earn their roles, their behavior changes (Hoffman et al. 1994, 1998;
Cherry et al. 2002; Oxoby and Spraggon 2008; Gachter and Riedl 2005). Based on previous
findings, we suggest several hypotheses as to the impact of earned rights on the frequency and
intensity of conflicts.
In general, we argue that when subjects earn their roles and the initial allocation of
resources clearly assigns first-mover rights to one individual, cooperation will be easier because
subjects’ expectations will be aligned. Specifically, we expect that earned rights will decrease
conflict entry by Responders because Responders will respect the rights of Proposers who make
positive offers (Gachter and Riedl 2005).
6

Hypothesis 1: Earned rights decrease the rate of conflict entry by Responders.

The first hypothesis suggests that earned rights should decrease the frequency of conflicts
and increase the probability of conflict resolution. At the same time, earned rights may also lead
to heavier fighting by Proposers because rebuffed attempts at cooperation can lead to retaliation.
This can also be interpreted as earned rights producing an endowment effect (Gintis 2007).

Hypothesis 2: Conditional on conflict, earned rights increase conflict expenditures by Proposers.

Thus, we hypothesize that earned rights will decrease the frequency of conflicts and
increase the probability of conflict resolution (Hypothesis 1). However, if and when conflict
ensues, we expect Proposers to react spitefully because they will believe that their property right
is being disrespected (Hypothesis 2).
Finally, the expected effect of earned rights on offers is indeterminate because there are
two potential effects. First, those subjects who would already seek to cooperate by making
positive offers when rights are randomly assigned may decrease their offers if they believe they
have earned the right to a larger share of the surplus (Hoffman et al., 1994). On the other hand,
some Proposers who would not make positive offers if rights were randomly assigned may now
choose to offer positive amounts because they have expectations that a sufficient offer will
induce non-entry.

2.4. Procedures
To test these hypotheses we ran three experimental sessions of each treatment with 12
subjects per session. Each session consisted of 30 periods of a single treatment in which subjects
were randomly and anonymously re-matched in each period. Subjects were assigned the role of
either Proposer or Responder (randomly in the Random treatment and earned through quiz
competition in the Earned treatment), and they persisted in that role throughout. At the end of
each experimental session, subjects completed a brief demographic survey. To reinforce the oneshot incentives of the game, subjects knew beforehand that we would select five of the 30
periods for payment using a bingo cage; subjects’ earnings from these five periods were added to
7

or subtracted from a participation fee of $20. We converted endowments and earnings to USD at
a rate of 30 = $1 and subjects were paid privately in cash at the end of the experiment. Sessions
lasted one hour each.
Subjects were recruited at random from the undergraduate student body of Chapman
University. Subjects sat at, and interacted via, visually isolated computer terminals, and
instructions were read aloud by the experimenter as subjects followed along on paper. Subjects
received a participation fee of $20 for arriving to the session on time and which was increased or
decreased according to their performance in the session. Subjects received their earnings in cash
privately at the end of each session. The average experimental earnings, including the $20
participation fee, were $22.6, ranging from a low of $16.0 to a high of $28.3. No subject
participated more than once, and no subject had prior experience with a similar experimental
environment. Instructions for the Earned treatment are included in the Appendix. Instructions for
the other treatments and the quiz are available from the authors upon request.

3. Results
3.1. Comparisons to the Theory
Table 2 displays summary statistics for our treatments. Theory predicts a total surplus of
30 in both the Random and Earned treatments (see Table 1). However, the data from the
experiment indicate that in the Random and Earned treatments, the average surpluses of 20.3 and
18.4 are significantly lower than the theoretical prediction of 30.

Finding 1: Surplus in both treatments is smaller than predicted.

To support these conclusions we estimated simple panel regressions separately for each
treatment, where the dependent variable is the surplus (payoff) and the independent variables are
a constant and a period trend. The models included a random effects error structure, with the
individual subject as the random effect, to account for the multiple decisions made by individual
subjects. The standard errors were clustered at the session level, to control for the fact that
multiple subjects repeatedly interacted with each other in a given session. Based on Wald tests
conducted on estimates of each model, we found that surplus in all treatments is significantly
lower than predicted (p-values < 0.01).
8

Furthermore, much of the predicted surplus is lost due to substantial overinvestment in
conflict relative to the predictions (see Figures 1a and 1b). Additional panel regressions for each
treatment where conflict expenditure is the dependent variable and the independent variables are
a constant, a dummy variable indicating whether the subject was a Responder, and a period trend
indicate that these differences are statistically significant. As before, we include a random effects
error structure by subject to account for multiple observations, and we cluster standard errors by
session. Wald tests confirm that expenditures are greater than the predicted value of 15 (p-values
< 0.01), and the coefficient on the Responder dummy is positive but insignificant for all
treatments.
However, the welfare losses due to over-dissipation are actually understated by the fact
that some pairs in both the Random and Earned treatments are able to use side-payments to avoid
conflict – with probabilities 0.16 and 0.23, respectively. Figures 2a and 2b display histograms of
side-payment offers for each treatment, and we confirm that offers are also significant larger than
predicted by the theory with additional random-effects panel regressions for each treatment
where the Proposer’s stage 1 offer is the dependent variable and the independent variables are a
constant and a period trend. We cluster standard errors by session, and Wald tests confirm that
offers are greater than the predicted amount of 0 in both the Random and Earned treatments (pvalues < 0.01).
Overall, these results are consistent with the findings of other studies on contests and
conflict resolution (for a review see Dechenaux et al. 2012). Specifically, the findings that
subjects sometimes use non-binding side-payments to successfully resolve conflicts (16% in
Random and 23% in Earned), replicate the findings of Kimbrough and Sheremeta (2012), who
report a conflict resolution rate of 14%. The finding that subjects overinvest in conflict (modeled
as a lottery contest) replicates the findings of a large experimental literature on rent-seeking
(Davis and Reilly 1998; Potters et al. 1998; Anderson and Stafford 2003; Sheremeta 2010a,
2010b, 2011; Sheremeta and Zhang 2010; Mago et al. 2011, 2012; Chowdhury et al. 2012).
These facts taken together indicate that our data replicate the patterns of deviation from
the theory observed in other studies, so now we turn our focus to the hypothesized effects of
earned rights.

9

3.2. Earned Rights
First we examine whether the Earned treatment yields a significant increase in the
probability of avoiding conflict. Recall, Hypothesis 1 states that earned rights should decrease
entry by Responders and increase the probability of conflict resolution. Table 2 provides support
for Hypothesis 1, indicating that conflict in the Earned treatment is resolved with significantly
higher probability than in the Random treatment (probability of 0.23 versus 0.16), leading to
44% increase in the conflict resolution rate in the Earned case.

Finding 2: Earned rights increase the probability of conflict resolution because Proposers make
persistent and significantly larger offers in the Earned treatment.

Table 3 displays the probability of conflict resolution by treatment, conditional on the
size of the side-payment offer. For offers in the intervals [0, 15], (15, 30], and (30, 60], the
probability of avoiding conflict is increasing for both treatments, but the probability is
consistently higher for the Earned treatment. This finding and a significant and negative effect of
offer size on conflict probability are supported by regression analysis.
Specifically, we estimate a linear probability model where the dependent variable is one
or zero indicating whether the Responder chose to enter the conflict stage. Restricting attention
to non-zero offers, we estimate the impact of earned rights on the probability of entry,
controlling for a period trend, the amount of the proposer’s offer, and whether the offer was
accepted. We include random effects to account for multiple observations on each subject, and
we cluster standard errors by session. The effect of earned rights on the probability of conflict is
negative and weakly significant (p-value = 0.09), and the effect of offer size is significant and
negative (p-value < 0.01).
However, this regression underestimates the treatment effect because offers are
persistently higher in the Earned treatment. The mean offer in the Earned treatment is 15.8 while
it is only 12.3 in the Random treatment (Table 2). Figures 2a and 2b, displaying histograms of
bargaining stage offers in the Random and Earned treatments, indicate the increase in the
observed frequency of offers around 30 in the Earned treatment.
The effect of earned rights on offers is even more pronounced when we look at the
change in the distribution of offers over time. Figure 3 displays time series of the mean offer in
10

the Earned and Random treatments. In the first 10 periods, the mean offer of 18.7 in the Random
treatment is marginally higher than the mean offer of 17.5 in the Earned treatment. However, by
the final 10 periods, the mean offer in the Random treatment has fallen by 63% to 7.0, while the
mean offer in the Earned treatment has fallen only by 9% to 16.0.
Regression analysis indicates a significant relative decline in offers in the Random
treatment. We estimate a panel regression with a random effects error structure to account for
multiple observations on each subject, and we cluster standard errors at the session level. The
dependent variable is the amount of the offer, and the independent variables are a constant, a
period trend, an Earned treatment dummy variable, and a term capturing the interaction of the
period trend and the Earned rights dummy. The coefficient on the interaction term is positive and
significant (p-value < 0.01) and the coefficient on period alone is negative and significant (pvalue < 0.01). A Wald test cannot reject the linear hypothesis that the period trend and the
period×treatment interaction term sum to zero, which indicates that offers decline over time only
in the Random treatment (p-value = 0.13).
To understand the source of the treatment effect on offers, Figure 4 displays time series
of offers for each Proposer. In both the Random and Earned treatments, many subjects make
substantial offers in early periods, but in the Earned treatment, far fewer of those subjects
eventually reduce their offers to 0. The bold outlined panels in Figure 4 show subjects who made
cooperative offers in early periods and later reduced their offers. Eleven subjects in the Random
treatment offered less than 5 (on average) over the final 10 periods, while only five subjects do
the same in the Earned treatment. Hence, earned rights induce persistent attempts at cooperation,
which translate into a 44% increase in the probability of conflict resolution.
Despite the surplus gains from attempted cooperation and the resulting increase in the
probability of avoiding conflicts, our data indicate that earned rights had no significant effect on
total welfare10, in particular due to a reduction in Proposer payoffs (see Table 2).11 What explains
these apparently contradictory tendencies? Table 4 displays statistics on offers, rejections, and
10

We estimate simple panel regressions, with subject-specific random effects and standard errors clustered by
session where the dependent variable is surplus and the independent variables are a constant, a period trend, and an
Earned treatment dummy. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the Earned treatment has no effect (p-value >
0.7).
11
We estimate additional random-effects panel regressions, with standard errors clustered by session, separately for
Proposers and Responders. The dependent variable is individual payoff and the independent variables are a constant,
a period trend, and an Earned treatment dummy. The effect of earned rights is negative and (weakly) significant
only for proposers in the Earned treatment (p-value = 0.06).
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conflicts in each treatment. To understand the source of the decrease in Proposers’ payoffs,
notice first that Proposers in the Earned treatment make non-zero offers 75% of the time versus
only 70% in the Random treatment. Furthermore, Responders reject a slightly larger percentage
of non-zero offers in the Random treatment, which allows Responders to retain more of the
surplus. This partly explains the decrease in Proposers payoffs, but both effects are welfare
neutral, given that side-payments merely transfer resources to the Responder. To understand why
the Earned treatment does not generate an increase in total surplus, we analyze the conflict
expenditures of each type in both treatments.

Finding 3: There is no significant effect of earned rights on total surplus because the increase in
the rate of conflict resolution is offset by higher conflict expenditures by those Proposers who
find themselves in a conflict after their offer is accepted.

According to Hypothesis 2, when conflict ensues, earned rights should increase contest
expenditures by Proposers, thereby reducing surplus. Table 5 displays average conflict
expenditure by treatment and subject type, depending on whether a positive offer was accepted
or rejected. In the Random treatment, non-zero accepted offers lead Proposers to reduce their
expenditures (either because the positive offer signals cooperative intentions or because they are
cutting their losses), but in the Earned treatment, when Responders accept positive offers and
still choose to enter the conflict, Proposers react spitefully, fighting just as hard as when their
offers are rejected.
These results receive statistical support in additional random-effects panel regressions,
estimated separately for Proposers and Responders and restricted to observations in which
Proposers made non-zero offers. The dependent variable is conflict expenditure and the
independent variables are a constant, a period trend, the stage 1 offer, an Earned treatment
dummy, a binary variable indicating whether the offer was accepted, and an interaction term of
the treatment dummy and whether the offer was accepted. We cluster standard errors by session.
For Proposers, the coefficient on “accept” is significant and negative (p-value < 0.02), which
indicates that Proposers in the Random treatment invest less when their offers are accepted. On
the other hand, the coefficient on the interaction term is significant and positive (p-value < 0.02),
and a Wald test cannot reject the hypothesis that the two coefficients sum to zero (p-value =
12

0.77). This indicates that Earned treatment proposers fight just as hard when their offer is
accepted as when it is rejected, thus accounting for the diminished surplus. All other coefficients
except the constant are insignificant (p-values > 0.5).12 In the estimated equation for Responders,
all coefficients are insignificant (p-values > 0.15).

Finding 4: Controlling for offer size, Proposers in the Earned treatment expend more resources
in conflict when their offers are accepted than Proposers in the Random treatment.

Taken together, this evidence explains why earned rights do not change the aggregate
surplus, despite decreasing the probability of conflict. According to these findings, earned rights
impact behavior in three important ways: (1) Proposers who have earned their position
persistently offer larger side-payments; (2) larger offers lead to a lower probability of conflict;
but (3) Earned Proposers whose offers do not lead to conflict resolution respond spitefully and
spend just as much in conflict as when offers are rejected (Finding 3). Hence, with earned rights,
the positive welfare effects of reduced conflict frequency are offset by greater conflict intensity,
resulting in unchanged surplus.

4. Discussion
In many contexts, individuals and groups attempt to employ non-binding mechanisms to
resolve costly conflicts. As our biblical example suggests, the threat of resource conflict has
motivated attempts to implement such mechanisms, despite issues of enforceability, far into
recorded history, and recent research suggests that similar mechanisms are at work in many
small-scale societies even today (e.g., Gurven 2004; Schechter 2007). Here, we design an
experiment to explore how the effectiveness of non-binding conflict resolution mechanisms
depends on how the objects of conflict were allocated in the first place. In particular, we examine
how earned rights to a valuable resource impact the following variables: (1) the willingness to
offer payments intended to obviate resource conflict, (2) the willingness to accept such payments
and voluntarily forgo conflict, and (3) the costs of conflicts that result from failed attempts at
cooperation.
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An alternative specification excluding the interaction term shows no effect of accepting the offer and instead gives
a positive and weakly significant coefficient on the Earned treatment dummy (p-value = 0.09), which imperfectly
captures the same effect.
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In previous literature, earned entitlements frequently increase the extent to which
behavior approximates Nash play in bargaining games. When subjects observe that a decision
maker has earned the right to an assigned role (e.g., the Proposer), the decision maker often
behaves more selfishly and others are more likely to accept decisions that favor the right-holder
(e.g., by accepting lower offers in ultimatum games, see Hoffman et al. 1994). However, in these
papers, the disagreement payoff is exogenous and subjects whose offers are rejected have no
opportunity to impact the payoffs of their counterpart after bargaining. Here we endogenize the
disagreement payoff in the conflict stage, which allows us to identify both the gains from
bargained conflict resolution and the costs of conflict escalation after bargaining fails.
In the Nash equilibrium of our two-stage conflict game with non-binding side-payment
contracts for conflict resolution, Proposers offer nothing to Responders since they know that
Responders will accept their offer, take the transfer payment, and then choose to enter the
conflict anyway. However, when Proposers earn the right to make side-payment offers, it creates
a sense of entitlement to a share of the prize. Proposers respond by offering more and persisting
in making high offers over time. These offers increase the rate of conflict resolution, but this
does not improve welfare. When Proposers who earned their role observe their counterparts
accepting transfer payments and nevertheless choosing to enter the conflict, they increase the
intensity of conflict, offsetting the gains from higher conflict avoidance.
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Tables

Table 1: Experimental Design and Theoretical Predictions
Treatment
Player
Random Earned
*
Side-payment, s
Proposer
0
0
Probability of Conflict Resolution Responder
0.00
0.00
Proposer
15
15
Equilibrium Expenditure, e*
Responder
15
15
Proposer
15
15
Expected Payoff, E(*)
Responder
15
15
Available Surplus, v
60
60
Equilibrium Surplus, *
30
30

Table 2: Average Individual Per Period Surplus and Expenditure by Treatment
Treatment
Player
Random
Earned
Side-payment, s
Proposer
12.3 (13.2) 15.8 (14.1)
Probability of Conflict Resolution Responder
0.16
0.22
Proposer
23.3 (12.7) 26.9 (10.9)
Average Expenditure, e
Responder
23.9 (12.8) 27.3 (12.3)
Proposer
5.1 (33.1)
1.9 (34.1)
Average Payoff, 
Responder
15.2 (30.1) 16.5 (29.2)
Total Surplus, 
20.3
18.4
Standard deviations in parentheses.

Table 3: Probability of Conflict Resolution Conditional on the Side-Payment Offer
Treatment
Side-Payment
Random Earned
0 ≤ s ≤ 15
0.07
0.09
15 < s ≤ 30
0.24
0.36
30 < s ≤ 60
0.48
0.64
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Table 4: Number of Offers, Rejections and Conflicts
Treatment
Random Earned
# of Offers
540
540
# of Non-Zero Offers
377
404
(0.70)
(0.75)
# of Rejections
199
169
(0.37)
(0.31)
# of Non-Zero Rejections
70
70
(0.19)
(0.17)
# of Conflicts Avoided
89
125
(0.16)
(0.23)
Probabilities in parentheses.

Table 5: Mean Non-Zero Offers and Expenditures by Treatment
Treatment
Random
Earned
Decision Player
Offer > 0 Expenditure
Offer > 0
Expenditure
Proposer
16.9 (12)
20.9 (12.4)
20.4 (11.4)
28.2 (11.6)
Accept
Responder
16.9 (12)
22.7 (12.7)
20.4 (11.4)
27.4 (13.3)
Proposer
9.6 (9.7)
26.8 (11.4)
8.9 (8.5)
27.8 (9.9)
Reject
Responder
9.6 (9.7)
26.8 (12.1)
8.9 (8.5)
28.6 (9.8)
Standard deviation in parentheses.
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Appendix: Instructions for the Earned Treatment
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision-making. Various research agencies have
provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple. If you follow them closely and make appropriate
decisions, you and the 11 other participants in this experiment can earn an appreciable amount of money, which will
be paid to you in CASH at the end of today’s experiment.
The currency used in the experiment is francs. Francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of _30_
francs to _1_ dollar. You have already received a $20.00 participation fee (this includes the $7 show up fee). The
experiment will consist of 30 periods and at the end of the experiment we will randomly choose 5 of the 30 periods
for actual payment using a bingo cage. We will sum your total earnings for these 5 periods and convert them to a
U.S. dollar payment.
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s decisions. If you have any
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk,
laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your
cooperation. The remainder of the instructions will describe the decisions you may face in each period.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR STAGE 1
At the beginning of each period, you will be randomly and anonymously placed into a group of 2
participants. Each randomly chosen pair will consist of one Proposer and one Responder.
The positions of Proposer and Responder will be determined by your scores on a quiz before the first
period of the experiment. Each of you will be asked the same set of 10 questions. Your quiz score is the number of
questions you answered correctly. Quiz scores will be ranked from highest to lowest and ties are decided by giving a
higher ranking to the person who finishes the quiz in the shortest amount of time.
Once the complete rankings of participants are determined, you will enter your name, and the participants
will be divided into two groups, the Proposers and the Responders. The lower ranking half will be Responders for all
periods of the experiment. The higher-ranking half has earned the right to be Proposers. Your role will determine the
decisions that you make.
Once the roles have been assigned, an experimenter will direct you to another computer. The computer will
display in the middle of the screen which role you have been assigned.
The composition of your pair will be changed randomly every period. Each period will consist of two
stages. In Stage 1, you and the other participant in your group will bargain over a reward. The reward is worth 60
francs to you and the other participant in your group.
YOUR DECISION
In each period, the Proposer will be endowed with the 60 franc reward and will have an opportunity to
make an Offer to the Responder. The Proposer may offer any integer number of francs between 0 and 60. An
example of the Proposer’s decision screen is shown below.
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Once the Proposer has entered an offer and submitted that offer to the Responder, the Responder will
choose either to Accept or Reject the offer and also whether to enter Stage 2 or not. An example of the Responder’s
decision screen is shown below.

EARNINGS
If the Responder accepts the offer and decides not to enter stage 2, the Responder receives a payment equal
to the offer, and the Proposer receives the 60 franc reward minus the amount of the offer:
Proposer Earnings
= 60 – Offer
Responder Earnings
= Offer
If the Responder rejects the offer and decides not to enter stage 2, the Responder receives a payment equal
to 0, and the Proposer receives the 60 franc reward:
Proposer Earnings
= 60
Responder Earnings
=0
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If the Responder accepts the offer and decides to enter Stage 2, then the experiment moves to Stage 2 in
which the Responder may attempt to take the reward. In that case, the Responder receives a payment equal to the
earnings from Stage 2 plus the offer, and the Proposer receives the earnings from Stage 2 minus the offer:
Proposer Earnings
= Earnings in Stage 2 – Offer
Responder Earnings
= Earnings in Stage 2 + Offer
If the Responder rejects the offer, then the experiment moves to Stage 2 in which the Responder may
attempt to take the reward. In that case, both participants will receive their earnings from decisions made in Stage 2:
Proposer Earnings
= Earnings in Stage 2
Responder Earnings
= Earnings in Stage 2
Note, if the Responder decides not to enter stage 2 (disregarding whether he accepts or rejects the offer)
then the period ends after stage 1. However, if the Responder decides to enter stage 2 (disregarding whether he
accepts or rejects the offer) both participants will enter stage 2.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR STAGE 2
DECISION IN STAGE 2
In Stage 2, the Responder may attempt to take the reward from the Proposer. Each participant may bid for
the 60 franc reward. You may bid any integer number of francs between 0 and 60. An example of your decision
screen is shown below.

EARNINGS IN STAGE 2
After all participants have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are calculated. Regardless of
who receives the reward, all participants will have to pay their bids. Thus, your earnings in stage 2 will be calculated
in the following way:
If you receive the reward:
Earnings in Stage 2 = 60 – Your Bid
If you do not receive the reward:
Earnings in Stage 2 = 0 – Your Bid
Remember you have already received a $20.00 participation fee (equivalent to 600 francs). Depending on a
period, you may receive either positive or negative earnings. At the end of the experiment we will randomly select 5
out of 30 periods for actual payment. You will sum the total earnings for these 5 periods and convert them to a U.S.
dollar payment. If the earnings are negative, we will subtract them from your participation fee. If the earnings are
positive, we will add them to your participation fee.
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What Does my Bid Mean?
The more you bid, the more likely you are to receive the reward. The more the other participant in your
group bids, the less likely you are to receive the reward. Specifically, for each franc you bid you will receive one
lottery ticket. At the end of each period the computer draws randomly one ticket among all the tickets purchased by
you and the other participant in the group. The owner of the drawn ticket receives the reward worth 60 francs. Thus,
your chance of receiving the reward is given by the number of francs you bid divided by the total number of francs
you and the other participant in your group bids.

If both participants bid zero, the reward is randomly assigned to one of the two participants in the group.
Example of the Random Draw
This is a hypothetical example used to illustrate how the computer is making a random draw. If participant
1 bids 10 francs and participant 2 bids 20 francs, the computer assigns 10 lottery tickets to participant 1 and 20
lottery tickets to participant 2. Then the computer randomly draws one lottery ticket out of 30 (10 + 20). As you can
see, participant 2 has higher chance of receiving the reward: 0.67 = 20/30. Participant 2 has 0.33 = 10/30 chance of
receiving the reward.
After all participants make their bids, the computer will make a random draw which will decide who
receives the reward. Then the computer will calculate your period earnings based on your bid and whether you
received the reward or not.
At the end of each period, the Proposer’s offer, whether the offer was accepted, whether the Responder
entered Stage 2, your bid, the other participant’s, whether you received the reward or not, and the earnings for the
period are reported on the outcome screen as shown below. Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record
your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet under the appropriate heading. An example of the
outcome screen is shown below.

IMPORTANT NOTES
You will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to which group. At the beginning of
each period you will be randomly re-grouped with one other participant to form a two-person group. You can never
guarantee yourself the reward. However, if you are the Proposer in stage 1, and the Responder decides not to enter
stage 2, you will receive the reward. Furthermore, if the experiment proceeds to stage 2 then by increasing your bid
in stage 2, you can increase your chance of receiving the reward. In stage 2, regardless of which participant receives
the reward, all participants must pay their bids.
Are there any questions?
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